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PAUL MANAFORT, MONICA LEWINSKY, AND
THE PENN STATE THREE CASE:
WHEN SHOULD THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
VITIATE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
Lance Cole*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the application of the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege in cases involving efforts to use an attorney-client relationship
to conceal past misconduct. The Article concludes that the law in some jurisdictions,
including Pennsylvania, may make it too difficult to establish that the crime-fraud
exception applies in such cases. Accordingly, it argues that the test for application of the
exception should require only credible evidence of the client's intentional misuse of the
attorney-client relationship, particularly when the misuse of the attorney's services is
intended to cover up an ongoing course of criminal conduct such as a conspiracy to
obstruct justice.
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INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest evidentiary privilege recognized in
Anglo-American common law.' The privilege and its closely related but much
younger 2 compatriot the attorney work-product doctrine 3 play vitally important
roles in both civil and criminal cases in the state and federal judicial systems, as
well as in administrative and regulatory legal proceedings. 4 The confidentiality
protections provided by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
doctrine are not absolute, however, and are subject to a number of
well-recognized exceptions. 5 This Article focuses on what is arguably the most
important of these exceptions: the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege and the attorney work-product doctrine.
6
Although the Supreme Court provided guidance on when a court should
entertain a crime-fraud exception claim in United States v. Zolin,7 that case did
1. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961));
see also Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the
Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 474-80 (2003) (describing
"[t]he [i]mportance of the [a]ttorney-[c]lient [p]rivilege in the American [l]egal [s]ystem").
2. In contrast to the attorney-client privilege's ancient origins, which date back to Roman law,
Cole, supra note 1, at 474 75; see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2290 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961), the Supreme Court approved the attorney
work-product doctrine in 1947, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In the federal system,
protection for attorney work product was not an issue before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permitted extensive pretrial discovery because attorneys previously had not sought information from
adversaries prior to trial. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 96, at 148 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999) ("Thus, under the old chancery practice of discovery, the adversary was not required to disclose,
apart from his own testimony, the evidence which he would use, or the names of the witnesses he
would call in support of his own case.").
3. See Cole, supra note 1, at 480-84 (describing the development of the attorney work-product
doctrine and contrasting that doctrine to the attorney-client privilege).
4. In 1888 the Supreme Court described the policy grounds for the attorney-client privilege as
"founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed
of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure." Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine in the leading case on the corporate attorney-client privilege. Upjohn, 449 U.S.
at 397 402 (recognizing the importance of preserving confidential attorney-client communications).
5. See Cole, supra note 1, at 498 514 (describing exceptions to and checks on the application of
the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud exception).
6. See generally United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). In Zolin the Supreme Court
recognized that the privilege should not be available if the purpose of a client's communications with
counsel is to further a future or ongoing crime or other wrongdoing. See id. at 562-63; see also Cole,
supra note 1, at 492 95 (summarizing the Zolin opinion and the crime-fraud exception).
7. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
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not specify how much or what kind of proof is necessary, or how much evidence
of intent by the client is required, for a court to invoke the exception and
overcome the application of the privilege. 8 State courts and the lower federal
courts have since been left to grapple with this important issue on a case-by-case
basis and have reached differing conclusions. 9 This Article examines the law that
has developed in this area since the Supreme Court decided Zolin and argues
that setting too high a bar for application of the crime-fraud exception is
inconsistent with the policy grounds that underlie the attorney-client privilege'
0
and can have serious adverse consequences for the administration of justice. This
Article examines three highly publicized cases as vehicles for this analysis.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
The crime-fraud exception is essential to the proper functioning of the
attorney-client privilege because it provides a means for the legal system to
screen out instances in which clients seek to misuse the attorney-client
relationship to commit a crime, perpetrate a fraud, or cover up ongoing crimes or
frauds." The rationale for the crime-fraud exception is well established and
follows from the policy goals that underlie recognition of the attorney-client
privilege in the first instance; the attorney-client privilege is intended to promote
the administration of justice, and any use of the privilege that is inconsistent with
8. See Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 80
81 (1999) ("Zolin does not identify any new substantive dividing line for assessing when
communications fit the crime-fraud definitions. Zolin is procedural in nature."). This "quantum of
proof" issue for application of the crime-fraud exception, see Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563, is discussed in
more detail in Section III infra.
9. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Carter, No. 98-068, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at
*5 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1998) (comparing the approaches of the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit and
noting that "[t]here is some confusion over which of these standards the D.C. Circuit finds
controlling"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Sealed Case (Sealed Case III), 162 F.3d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1998). See infra note 14 and Part II.B for more detailed discussions of the Monica Lewinsky
case and the use of the crime-fraud exception to compel testimony from her attorney, Francis D.
Carter.
10. The Supreme Court in Zolin reaffirmed the notion that by encouraging "full and frank
communication[s] between attorneys and their clients," the attorney-client privilege "promote[s]
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice." Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562
(quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). But the Court also recognized that
the interests of the attorney-client privilege are not served when the client seeks to misuse the cloak of
confidentiality that the privilege provides to further or cover up a crime or fraud. See id. at 562 63.
11. See H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Context of Corporate Counseling, 87 Ky. L.J. 1191, 1218 (1999) ("Today, communications which would
otherwise be considered privileged ... are excepted from the privilege if the communication furthers
an ongoing or future crime. Indeed, it is to prevent abuse of the secrecy accorded bona fide
attorney-client communications that the modern crime-fraud exception has been fashioned." (footnote
omitted)); Rachel A. Hutzel, Note, Evidence: The Crime Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege,
United States v. Zolin, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 365, 372 (1990) ("The purpose of the crime-fraud
exception is generally to prevent the attorney-client privilege from shielding from prosecution the
client who uses his attorney's advice to initiate or continue a fraudulent or criminal activity.");
cf. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2298, at 572 ("It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege
cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with an attorney a crime or other evil enterprise.").
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that end should not be permitted. 2 The crime-fraud exception is intended to
prevent use of the attorney-client privilege to protect communications that do
not further legitimate purposes and therefore do not promote the administration
of justice. 13
It is important to recognize that the crime-fraud exception applies even if
the attorney is completely innocent and unaware of the client's wrongdoing; 14 it
is the intent and actions of the client-not the attorney-that determine whether
or not the exception applies.' 5 It is equally important to recognize that the
12. See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 418 22 (4th ed. 2001) (reviewing policy reasons for the exception and collecting cases);
PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY- CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 8.2, at 21 26 (2d ed. 2010);
see also Zolin, 491 U.S. at 568-69 (discussing the "policies underlying the privilege" and "the proper
functioning of the adversary process").
13. The fact that the attorney's representation merely coincides in time with client wrongdoing
is not sufficient. Rather than relying upon a mere "temporal nexus" to hold that the crime-fraud
exception applies, a court must find that the "requisite purposeful nexus" exists between the
communications and the crime or fraud. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d 32,
34 (2d Cir. 1986); see also David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the
Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 482 83 (1986)
(decrying "a tendency in this area for courts to assert that the cock's crowing made the sun rise, or at
least that the client's purpose must have been unlawful because the consultation was followed by the
commission of a crime" and suggesting "courts have lost sight of the principle of causation"). To meet
this requirement, a prosecutor often will attempt to rely upon the communications themselves as proof
that the exception applies. Cf. Christopher Paul Galanek, Note, The Impact of the Zolin Decision on
the Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 24 GA. L. REV. 1115, 1129 30 (1990)
(discussing the trend toward courts basing their application of the privilege upon an examination of
the privileged communications at issue). Commentators have criticized "the circularity of relying upon
the confidential communication itself to prove the client's fraudulent intent, which in turn serves as the
necessary justification for disclosure." See, e.g., Fried, supra, at 461; see also Galanek, supra, at 1124
(stating that the "circular proof problem" has "plagued the judicial system since the birth of the
[crime-fraud] exception"); Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White
Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors To Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 461-61
(1993) ("The circularity in asserting that the communication is dispositive of whether the privilege
applies to it is compounded by the fact that prosecutors arguing for the crime-fraud exception will
necessarily have only a limited amount of information about the content of the discussions on which to
move for disclosure."). The mere fact that the privileged communications at issue might aid the
prosecution in proving its case-in-chief does not make the crime-fraud exception applicable. See
Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277, 283 (8th Cir. 1984) ("That the [attorney-client
communication] may help prove that a [crime or] fraud occurred does not mean that it was used in
perpetrating the [crime or] fraud.").
14. For a particularly high-profile example of a case in which the crime-fraud exception was
invoked even though the lawyer was innocent of any wrongdoing, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
Carter, No. 98-068, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1998) (applying the
crime-fraud exception to Monica Lewinsky's communications with the attorney who assisted her with
the preparation of an affidavit stating that she did not engage in sexual relations with President Bill
Clinton and observing that "[t]he attorney does not need to know about his client's potential
wrongdoing for the exception to apply"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Sealed Case
(Sealed Case III), 162 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See infra Part II.B for a more detailed discussion of
the Lewinsky case.
15. See RICE, supra note 12, § 8.2, at 25 26; see also Brown, supra note 11, at 1232 ("[I]t is the
client's intent at the time of the communication that is considered determinative of whether the
crime-fraud exception will apply."); Fried, supra note 13, at 499 ("[T]he crime-fraud exception is
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exception will apply when an innocent and unknowing attorney's advice and
representation is used to conceal or hide ongoing criminal activity, such as a
conspiracy to hide past misconduct or obstruct justice. 16
Although the rationale for the crime-fraud exception is widely accepted, the
application of the exception in actual cases poses difficulties. 7 As one appellate
court explained, "The crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege
cannot be successfully invoked merely upon a showing that the client
communicated with counsel while the client was engaged in criminal activity."'
18
The party seeking to overcome the privilege must present evidence of something
more than ongoing criminal activity involving the client to establish that the
crime-fraud exception applies to communications between a client and an
predicated on the blameworthiness of the intention with which counsel was consulted ...."); Allison
E. Beach et al., Note, Procedural Issues, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1198 (2001) ("The crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege permits an attorney to disclose communications that indicate
a client intends future criminal behavior. Because it is controlled by the client's intent, this exception
applies even when the attorney has no actual or constructive knowledge of the crime." (footnote
omitted)). The importance of the client's motivation is illustrated by an articulation of a two-part test
for application of the exception by the Eleventh Circuit:
First, there must be a prima facie showing that the client was engaged in criminal or
fraudulent conduct when he sought the advice of counsel, that he was planning such
conduct when he sought the advice of counsel, or that he committed a crime or fraud
subsequent to receiving the benefit of counsel's advice. Second, there must be a showing
that the attorney's assistance was obtained in furtherance of the criminal or fraudulent
activity or was closely related to it.
In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 89-10 (MIA), 938 F.2d 1578, 1581 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re
Grand Jury Investigation (In re Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987)).
16. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Company X, 857 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir. 1988)
(stating that the law firm was used to "cover up and perpetuate" crimes). To establish a causal
connection between the privileged communications and criminal activity, the prosecution can make a
showing that "there is reasonable cause to believe that the attorney's services were utilized in
furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme." See United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1001 (9th Cir.
2002) (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings (In re The Corporation), 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir.
1996)); In re Richard Roe, Inc. (Roe II), 168 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Where the very act of
litigating is alleged as being in furtherance of a fraud, the party seeking disclosure under the
crime-fraud exception must show probable cause that the litigation or an aspect thereof had little or no
legal or factual basis and was carried on substantially for the purpose of furthering the crime or
fraud."); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Reasonable cause is more than
suspicion but less than a preponderance of the evidence."); In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 89-10
(MIA), 938 F.2d at 1581 (requiring a showing that "the attorney's assistance was obtained in
furtherance of the criminal or fraudulent activity or was closely related to it" (quoting In re Schroeder,
842 F.2d at 1226)).
17. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 13, at 443 (arguing that "the attorney-client privilege has been
seriously eroded through an overly expansive interpretation and application of the crime-fraud
exception" and urging "a re-examination of the developments ... that have led to this erosion");
Henning, supra note 13, at 411 (asserting that "courts have shown a willingness to limit defendants'
ability to use their attorneys as a shield by expanding the reach of the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege"); Ronald L. Motley & Tucker S. Player, Issues in "Crime-Fraud" Practice
and Procedure: The Tobacco Litigation Experience, 49 S.C. L. REV. 187, 198 (1998) ("A point of
contention among courts is the exact scope of the crime-fraud exception.").
18. Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d at 34.
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attorney. 19 Defining precisely what evidence must be presented to trigger
application of the exception and what process should be followed in evaluating
that evidence has proved difficult for the courts.
20
19. See In re Sealed Case (Sealed Case H), 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that
"'mere coincidence in time,' without more, cannot support the invocation of the exception"); see also
United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 271 72 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that "[i]t does not suffice that
the communications may be related to a crime" and the defendant's "failure to heed his lawyer's
counsel" does not render a communication in furtherance of crime); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
F.2d 155, 168 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[M]erely because some communications may be related to a crime is
not enough to subject that communication to disclosure .... ").
20. One troublesome issue is the "circularity" issue referred to in note 13 supra. The argument
that the client is guilty of a crime and therefore the crime-fraud exception applies is an argument that
prosecutors often will present to a court, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's first encounter with the
crime-fraud exception in Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891). In Alexander, the Court
reversed a murder conviction solely because the trial court had admitted into evidence ambiguous
privileged communications between the defendant and an attorney. Alexander, 138 U.S. at 360. The
defendant consulted counsel regarding property owned jointly with a partner. Id. at 357 58. The
partner was later found to have been killed before the consultation occurred. Id. at 355. At the
defendant's murder trial, the court relied upon the crime-fraud exception to permit the prosecution to
introduce the privileged consultation with counsel as evidence that the defendant knew the deceased
was missing and would profit from his murder. Id. at 358. The Supreme Court held that it was
reversible error to admit into evidence privileged communications that would be subject to the
crime-fraud exception only if the defendant in fact was guilty:
Now the communication in question was perfectly harmless upon its face. If it were true
that his partner was missing, and he had not heard from him, and that [the partner] had
taken off [with] the money, there was no impropriety in his consulting counsel for the
purpose of ascertaining if he could hold the horses, so as to secure his part of it.... It is
only by assuming that he was guilty of the murder that his scheme to defraud his partner
becomes at all manifest.
Id. at 360 (emphasis added). The Alexander Court refused to assume that the defendant was guilty and
to interpret ambiguous privileged communications as evidence of guilt:
It is evident from [the attorney's testimony] that defendant consulted with [the attorney]
as a legal adviser, and while, if he were guilty of the murder, it may have had a tendency to
show an effort on his part to defraud his partner's estate, and to make profit out of his
death, by appropriating to himself the partnership property, it did not necessarily have
that tendency and was clearly a privileged communication.
Id. at 358.
To approach the situation otherwise and assume prior to trial that a defendant is guilty of the
crime charged would emasculate the attorney-client privilege whenever criminal conduct is charged.
As Justice Cardozo later observed, "it would be absurd to say that the privilege could be got rid of
merely by making a charge of fraud." Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (quoting O'Rourke
v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604 (P.C.)). As the Court concluded in Alexander, invocation of the
crime-fraud exception is inappropriate in cases where the exception would be applicable only if the
defendant is assumed to be guilty. See Alexander, 138 U.S. at 360. A flaw in the Alexander Court's
reasoning, unrelated to the "circularity" problem, has limited the influence of the case, however. The
clarity of the holding in Alexander was obscured by a discussion distinguishing the facts of Alexander
from an English case, R v. Cox, [1884] 14 G.B. 153 (Eng.), in which the Alexander Court suggested that
the crime-fraud exception should only be invoked when the attorney-client communication furthered
the same crime that is being tried. Alexander, 138 U.S. at 359 60. Courts discussing Alexander have
accurately characterized this portion of the opinion as dicta and declined to follow that suggestion. See,
e.g., In re Schroeder, 842 F.2d at 1228; In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 554 55 (8th Cir. 1980); In re
Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805, 808 09 (7th Cir. 1956). Nothing in these cases undercuts the teaching
of Alexander that a trial court should not assume a defendant is guilty and interpret ambiguous
[Vol. 91
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The crime-fraud exception is a difficult area of the law, but it provides an
important limitation on availability of the attorney-client privilege. If the
exception is not properly applied by the courts, unscrupulous clients can misuse
the attorney-client relationship to further or cover up their crimes and
misconduct. Although the procedure for asserting a claim that the exception
applies now is more clearly defined, at least since the Supreme Court's Zolin
decision, 2 1 the courts still have not reached a uniform and consistent test for
assessing the ultimate merits of crime-fraud exception claims.22 In Zolin, the
Court required a relatively low showing of a "factual basis adequate to support a
good faith belief by a reasonable person" to obtain in camera review, 23 and it
rejected an independent evidence requirement. 24 As a result, if law enforcement
authorities have credible evidence that legal advice is being or has been misused,
they should be able to obtain judicial review to determine if the crime-fraud
exception should be invoked. 25 As discussed in more detail in Section III below,
however, the likely outcome of that judicial review is difficult to predict in many
jurisdictions. Because of the importance of the policies served by the
attorney-client privilege, it is essential that prosecutors and civil litigants be able
to ascertain where the boundary is between appropriate attorney-client
consultations and misuse of the attorney-client privilege by clients who are acting
in bad faith and seeking to abuse the justice system. This Article seeks to clarify
this important area of law.
attorney-client communications as furthering crime and therefore unprivileged. See, e.g., Berkley, 629
F.2d at 554 n.l (stating that Alexander held that the crime-fraud exception was inapplicable because
"the client's communication with the attorney was harmless on its face and did not necessarily relate to
any future intended wrongdoing").
21. Even prior to the Supreme Court's Zolin decision, the crime-fraud exception served the
important purpose of preventing misuse of the attorney-client privilege. See In re Sealed Case (Sealed
Case I), 676 F.2d 793, 812 16 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (overruling a claim of privilege (and work-product
protection) based upon the applicability of the crime-fraud exception).
22. See infra Section III.
23. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (quoting Caldwell v. Dist. Court, 644
P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)); see also infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
24. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574 ("In sum, we conclude that a rigid independent evidence
requirement does not comport with 'reason and experience,' and we decline to adopt it as part of the
developing federal common law of evidentiary privileges." (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
501)); see also infra notes 112 13 and accompanying text.
25. One commentator has asserted that growth of government regulation of business and
increased reporting requirements incorporating criminal penalties for failure to comply or for
providing false information has expanded the availability of the crime-fraud exception:
Not only can more acts be labeled "criminal" or "fraudulent," but lawyers play such a
pervasive role in advising clients on complying with or avoiding regulatory schemes that
the opportunity to use legal advice to commit an illegal act has increased correspondingly.
Moreover, the improper act does not have to be a violation of a specific criminal
provision, and the act only has to be one objective of seeking legal advice for the
exception to apply. Therefore, the question of whether an alleged course of conduct
qualifies as a crime or fraud is rarely at issue because the breadth of white collar criminal
law encompasses most acts which are of questionable legality.
Henning, supra note 13, at 460-61.
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Section II of this Article discusses the application of the crime-fraud
exception to three recent high-profile cases. Section III discusses the varying
tests the courts have developed for application of the crime-fraud exception. The
Conclusion section of the Article argues that some courts have set the bar for
application of the crime-fraud exception too high, making it difficult to apply the
exception when an attorney's services are used to conceal or cover up a past
crime or fraud.
II. THREE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES: PAUL MANAFORT, MONICA LEWINSKY, AND
THE PENN STATE THREE
A. Paul Manafort
In late 2017 Special Counsel Robert Mueller's office sought to use the
crime-fraud exception to compel the grand jury testimony of an attorney
who had represented Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and his business associate
Richard W. Gates in connection with submissions of information to the U.S.
Department of Justice.26 The communications at issue were representations
made by the attorney in two letters submitted on behalf of her clients Manafort
and Gates to the Foreign Agents Registration Act Registration Unit of the
Justice Department's National Security Division.27 Among other arguments in
support of compelling the attorney to testify before the grand jury, the Special
Counsel asserted that the crime-fraud exception applied because Manafort and
Gates had made materially false statements and misleading omissions in the
submissions the lawyer provided on their behalf to the Justice Department as
"part of a sustained scheme to hide funds in violation of the applicable money
laundering and tax statutes, among others."28
The attorney representing Manafort and Gates declined to provide
testimony to the grand jury about her communications with them absent a court
order to do so.29 The Special Counsel argued that the crime-fraud exception
applied to the attorney's communications with Manafort and Gates because the
attorney-client communications at issue "were made with an 'intent' to 'further a
crime, fraud, or other misconduct.""'3 The court analyzed the application of the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine
protections claimed by Manafort and Gates.3 ' For purposes of this Article, the
most important part of the court's analysis was that "[t]o satisfy its burden of
proof as to the crime-fraud exception, the government may offer 'evidence that if
believed by the trier of fact would establish the elements of an ongoing or
26. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, No. 17-2336, slip op. at 1 2, 1 n.1 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2017).
27. Id. at 3.
28. See id. at 10.
29. Id. at 11. The attorney relied on American Bar Association Formal Opinion No. 473 in
declining to testify unless compelled to do so by court order. Id.
30. Id. (quoting United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
31. See id. at 14 27, 3(-36.
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imminent crime or fraud.' 32 The court concluded that the evidence submitted by
the Special Counsel established that Manafort and Gates "likely violated federal
law by making, or conspiring to make, materially false statements and misleading
omissions" to the Justice Department. 33 This portion of the court's analysis is
helpful because it confirms, consistent with the D.C. Circuit authorities it cites,
that providing false information to the government in connection with an
ongoing crime or fraud is grounds for application of the crime-fraud exception.
With regard to the central question analyzed in this Article-the nature and
quantum of proof necessary to establish that an attorney's services are
sufficiently linked to a client's crime or fraud to support application of the
crime-fraud exception-the court's analysis in the Manafort Opinion 34 is less
helpful. The court noted that "[g]enerally, the crime-fraud exception reaches
communications or work product with a 'relationship' to the crime or fraud.
35
The court went on to note that "[t]he inquiry focuses on the 'client's intent in
consulting the lawyer or in using the materials the lawyer prepared' and that
"[t]he question is: Did the client consult the lawyer or use the material for the
purpose of committing a crime or fraud. ' 36 The court then concluded that the
Special Counsel was seeking "answers regarding communications" Manafort and
Gates had with their attorney "that have, at the very least, 'some relationship'
with the 'prima facie violation' of law." 37 Unfortunately this somewhat opaque
and conclusory finding of "some relationship" with a "prima facie violation of
law" does not provide a great deal of guidance as to precisely how and why the
communications of Manafort and Gates with their attorney furthered "an
ongoing or imminent crime or fraud.,31
But if one steps back from the verbal formulations and talismanic citations
and focuses on the basic facts set forth in the opinion, the analysis is more clear.
The court concluded that Manafort and Gates knowingly and intentionally
provided materially false or incomplete information to their attorney with the
intention that the misleading information would be submitted to the
government, and they did so to cover up their prior money laundering and tax
32. Id. at 15 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Grand Jury, 475 F.3d 1299, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
See infra Part II.C for an analysis of the Penn State Three case, to which the "ongoing" crime or fraud
requirement is particularly relevant.
33. In re Grand Jury Investigation, slip op. at 25. The court noted at the outset of its analysis that
to satisfy its burden as to the crime-fraud exception, the government "need not prove the existence of
a crime or fraud beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 15 (citing Sealed Case II, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)).
34. This Article refers to In re Grand Jury Investigation, No. 17-2336 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2017), as
the Manafort Opinion.
35. In re Grand Jury Investigation, slip op. at 25 (citation omitted) (quoting Sealed Case I, 676
F.2d 793, 814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1982)) (citing Sealed Case 11, 754 F.2d at 399).
36. Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
37. Id. at 26 (quoting Sealed Case II, 754 F.2d at 399) (citing Sealed Case I, 676 F.2d at 814 15).
38. See id. at 15 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Grand Jury, 475 F.3d 1299, 1305 (D.C. Cir.
2007)).
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crimes.3 9 Viewed in this light the Manafort case is an easy crime-fraud exception
case-the services of the lawyer were being used to further and conceal an
ongoing crime or fraud by providing false information to the government. This
case, like the Monica Lewinsky case discussed below, supports a basic principle
of crime-fraud exception law: if a lawyer's services are being used to submit false
information to the government as part of an effort to further or conceal a crime
or fraud, then the attorney-client privilege should be vitiated and the attorney
can and should be compelled to testify about communications with the client.
B. Monica Lewinsky
The Manafort case, which arose out of Special Counsel Robert Mueller's
investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, is not the
first time the crime-fraud exception has played a role in a high-profile
investigation involving the President of the United States. In the late 1990s
Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr shifted his focus from the
Whitewater land deal in Arkansas to President Clinton's relationship with White
House intern Monica Lewinsky. 40 Early in its investigation of the Lewinsky
affair, Independent Counsel Starr's office invoked the crime-fraud exception to
compel grand jury testimony and production of documents from Lewinsky's
attorney, much like Special Counsel Mueller relied upon the crime-fraud
exception to compel the testimony of the lawyer who had represented Manafort
and Gates. 4
1
39. Gates subsequently pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering and tax offenses
and to making a false statement to federal investigators. See Plea Agreement at 1 12, United States v.
Gates, Crim. No. 17-201-2 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018). Manafort was subsequently convicted of eight
counts of bank fraud and tax crimes after a jury trial in federal court in Virginia. See United States v.
Manafort, Crim. No. 1:18-CR-83 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2018). After his conviction in Virginia, Manafort
entered into a plea agreement with Special Counsel Robert Mueller to resolve additional federal
Foreign Agents Registration Act conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, tax and foreign bank
account conspiracy, and witness tampering conspiracy charges in the District of Columbia. See Plea
Agreement at 1 3, United States v. Manafort, Crim. No. 17-201-1 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018). At the time
this Article was being prepared for publication, the Special Counsel had charged that Manafort had
breached his plea agreement by lying to federal agents. See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort Breached
Plea Deal by Repeatedly Lying, Mueller Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2018), http://nyti.ms/2zralPr
[http://perma.cc/V5T3-RBHA]. Manafort was subsequently sentenced to seven-and-a-half years in
prison. See Sharon LaFraniere, Paul Manafort's Prison Sentence Is Nearly Doubled to 7 1/2 Years, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), http://nyti.ms/2TAN8ow [http://perma.cc/ZV9H-8X60].
40. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 105-310 (1998). For a summary of the various efforts of Starr's
office to overcome assertions of privilege by the Clinton White House in the Monica Lewinsky
investigation, see ROBERT W. RAY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN RE: MADISON
GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, REGARDING MONICA LEWINSKY AND OTHERS 103 08
(2002). This report describes only privilege disputes pertaining to the Monica Lewinsky investigation
and does not describe efforts by Starr's office to overcome the privilege in its other investigations, such
as the successful efforts to overcome privilege assertions by attorneys in the White House Counsel's
Office and the unsuccessful attempt to obtain the notes taken by Deputy White House Counsel
Vincent Foster's attorney. See id.
41. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Carter, No. 98-068, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *3 4
(D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1998), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Sealed Case (Sealed Case III), 162
F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Starr's investigative tactics have been criticized by many commentators, and
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For purposes of the analysis in this Article, the important aspect of the
Monica Lewinsky investigation is her retention of Washington, D.C. attorney
Francis D. Carter to represent her in connection with the Paula Jones civil sexual
harassment lawsuit against President Clinton and to prepare an affidavit stating
that Lewinsky did not have a sexual relationship with President Clinton. 42 In
early 1998, shortly after Starr's office began investigating the Lewinsky matter, it
issued grand jury subpoenas to Carter calling for him to provide testimony and
produce documents relating to his representation of Lewinsky. 43 Carter moved
to quash the subpoenas, arguing, among other things, that the subpoenas
improperly sought to invade Lewinsky's attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine protections. 44 Starr's office countered with the argument
that the crime-fraud exception applied and therefore Carter should be compelled
to produce the subpoenaed documents and testify before the grand jury.45
Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson analyzed the application of the
crime-fraud exception to Lewinsky's engagement of Carter to prepare the
affidavit. 46 Based upon an in camera submission of evidence by Starr's office,
Chief Judge Johnson concluded that the crime-fraud exception was applicable
and overruled the assertions of attorney-client privilege.47 The evidence
contained in the in camera submission was sufficient to convince the court that
Lewinsky "committed perjury when she signed her affidavit, procured as a result
of Mr. Carter's legal advice, and used her false affidavit as part of a broader
scheme to obstruct justice. ' 48 Judge Johnson also concluded that the crime-fraud
the actions of his office in the Lewinsky investigation have been a particular focus of criticism. See,
e.g., Sanford Levinson, Structuring Intimacy: Some Reflections on the Fact that the Law Generally Does
Not Protect Us Against Unwanted Gazes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2074 (2001) (criticizing Starr's decision to
compel Lewinsky's mother to testify before the grand jury); Deborah L. Rhode, Conflicts of
Commitment: Legal Ethics in the Impeachment Context, 52 STAN. L. REV. 269, 279 80 (2000)
(criticizing Starr for not adequately supervising his office's contacts with Linda Tripp). Even the Chief
Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia expressed "concern that the
Office of Independent Counsel may have acted improperly in conducting immunity negotiations with
Ms. Lewinsky without the presence of her counsel." Carter, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *28; see
also Rhode, supra, at 335 36 (criticizing Starr's office for disrupting Lewinsky's attorney-client
relationship with Carter). But see RAY, supra note 40, at 103 08 (defending the actions of Starr's office
and rejecting Department of Justice Special Counsel Jo Ann Harris's finding that poor professional
judgment was exercised in planning and executing the office's initial contact with Lewinsky). For a
comprehensive critique of Starr's conduct and professional judgment in connection with the Lewinsky
investigation, see generally Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's OIC and the
Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1999).
42. See Sealed Case III, 162 F.3d at 672 (describing Lewinsky's retention of Carter and quoting
the affidavit that Carter prepared for Lewinsky); see also RAY, supra note 40, at 117 18 (summarizing
the litigation arising out of the Carter subpoenas).
43. See Sealed Case III, 162 F.3d at 672.
44. See Carter, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19497, at *1 2.
45. See id. at *4.
46. Id. at *3 18.
47. See id. at *5-4.
48. Id. at *6 7. In a footnote to the quoted statement, Judge Johnson explained that she was not
concluding that Lewinsky necessarily had committed those crimes: "The Court finds here that the
[Office of Independent Counsel] has met its burden under the crime-fraud exception. It expressly does
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exception should overcome the assertion of work-product doctrine protection
because Lewinsky consulted Carter for the purpose of committing perjury and
obstruction of justice and used his work-product for that purpose.49 Based upon
those conclusions, the court ordered Carter to testify and to produce the
subpoenaed documents.
50
The crime-fraud exception ruling, and the success of Starr's office in
overcoming the privilege and requiring Carter to testify and produce documents
relating to his representation of Lewinsky, did not generate significant attention
or controversy at the time.51 As suggested by the discussion above of the
application of the crime-fraud exception in the Manafort case, 52 Starr's reliance
on the exception to compel testimony of an attorney whose client was using the
attorney's services (albeit without the knowledge of the attorney) to submit false
and misleading information to the government (here the federal court hearing
the Jones sexual harassment case) is consistent with the policies underlying and
purpose of the exception. 53 Moreover, much like the analysis in the Manafort
Opinion, the court's analysis in the Lewinsky case does not provide any
especially helpful guidance on the difficult question-which is the focus of this
Article-of the nature and quantum of proof necessary to establish that an
attorney's services are sufficiently linked to a client's crime or fraud to support
application of the crime-fraud exception. Rather than analyze that issue, the
court merely observed that "case law on the crime-fraud exception nowhere
indicates that there must be a particular quantity of crime committed for the
exception to apply." 54 The court went on to conclude that the message of its
decision in the case was simply that "clients may not use their attorneys for the
express purpose of committing a crime or fraud and expect their communications
with the attorney to remain privileged.,
55
not find, however, that Ms. Lewinsky in fact committed those crimes." Id. at *6 n.2. In another portion
of the opinion, Judge Johnson made clear that "there is no suggestion that Mr. Carter knew about any
of the alleged wrongdoing." Id. at *5.
49. Id. at *7 8.
50. Id. The court did accept Carter's arguments that forcing him to produce certain items that
Lewinsky had given to him would violate Lewinsky's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. See id. at *18 20. That portion of Judge Johnson's opinion was reversed by the D.C.
Circuit Court. See Sealed Case III, 162 F.3d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976)) (concluding that, because no attorney-client privilege existed, there would be no
compulsion in violation of Lewinsky's Fifth Amendment privilege in forcing Carter to produce the
subpoenaed items). The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed Judge Johnson's ruling that the crime-fraud
exception applied, rejecting Lewinsky's materiality and intent arguments. See id. at 673 74.
51. Cf. Attorney-Client Privilege at Stake in Lewinsky Grand Jury Inquiry, 22 CHAMPION 7, 7
(1998) (noting that the matter had "received only cursory notice by the media").
52. See supra Part II.A.
53. Chief Judge Johnson rejected as "merely alarmist" the amicus brief arguments of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the District of Columbia Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers that application of the exception "under these circumstances would
eviscerate the privilege in garden-variety civil and criminal proceedings." Carter, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19497, at *10 (quoting the amici brief).
54. See id. at *8 9.
55. Id. at *11.
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Like the conclusory finding in the Manafort Opinion that the
attorney-client communications at issue had at least "some relationship" with a
violation of law,56 these statements about Lewinsky's actions do not provide a
great deal of helpful guidance for future cases on when the crime-fraud
exception should be applied. The Lewinsky case also is similar to the Manafort
case in that its facts present an easy crime-fraud exception application-the
services of the lawyer were being used to subvert the administration of justice by
providing false information to the government, in that case a federal court.
Also like the Manafort case, the Lewinsky case supports the basic
crime-fraud exception principle set forth above-that if a lawyer's services are
being used to submit false information to the government as part of an effort to
further or conceal a crime or fraud, then the attorney-client privilege should be
vitiated and the attorney can and should be compelled to testify about
communications with the client. Section III of this Article analyzes recent case
law relevant to this principle and attempts to provide a more precise explication
of the quantum and nature of proof that should be required to apply the
crime-fraud exception. Before doing so, however, it is useful to examine another
high-profile case in which, despite circumstances that would seem to invite its
application, the crime-fraud exception was not invoked, with arguably
detrimental consequences for both the justice system and the parties involved in
the case.
C. The Penn State Three
1. The Criminal Charges Against the Penn State Three
In November 2011 Jerry Sandusky, a respected former Penn State
University football coach, was accused by a Pennsylvania special investigating
grand jury57 of engaging in child sex abuse.58 On November 4, 2011, Sandusky
was charged with multiple counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
indecent assault, corruption of minors, unlawful contact with minors,
endangering the welfare of minors, aggravated indecent assault, and attempt to
commit indecent assault.5
9
In addition to the child sexual abuse charges against Sandusky, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office charged two Penn State University
administrative officers, Athletic Director Timothy M. Curley and Senior Vice
56. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, No. 17-2336, slip op. at 26 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2017).
57. Technically the special grand jury returned a "presentment" describing the crimes and
prosecutors prepared an indictment formally charging Sandusky with the crimes described in the grand
jury presentment report. See Police Criminal Complaint, Commonwealth v. Sandusky, No. CR-636-11
(Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 4, 2011), http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/sandusky /20
criminal% 20complaint%202422%200F%202011.pdf [http://perma.cc/B4FF-NLB2]. For an analysis of
grand jury law and practice in Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294, 314-15 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2016) (describing "The Grand Jury in Pennsylvania and the Advent of the Statutory Right
to Grand Jury Counsel").
58. See Police Criminal Complaint, supra note 57, Ex. A, at 24.
59. Id. Ex. A, at 2 15.
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President Gary C. Schultz, with failure to report child abuse and committing
perjury in their testimony to the Sandusky investigating grand jury.60 Curley and
Schultz were senior university officials who reported to then-university President
Graham B. Spanier.61 When Curley and Schultz were charged with perjury and
failing to report child sexual abuse, Spanier issued a press release expressing
"unconditional support" for Curley and Schultz, as well as "complete
confidence" that they had acted appropriately.62 Spanier's immediate and
unqualified statement of "unconditional support" for Curley and Schultz
ultimately proved damaging for him 63 and for Penn State University.
64
60. Information, Commonwealth v. Curley, No. CP-22-CR-5165-2011 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. March
13, 2017), http://www.dauphincounty.org/Courts/CurleySchultzSpanier/3-13-17 / 20Amended%/20
Criminal% 20lnformation %20and% 20Guilty%20Plea%20-%2OCurley.pdf [http://perma.cc/7UAQ-
KK8S]; Information, Commonwealth v. Schultz, No. CP-22-CR-5164-2011 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. March 13,
2017), http://www.dauphincounty.org/Courts/CurleySchultzSpanier/3-13-17 / 20Amended%/20
Criminal% 20Information %20and% 20Guilty %20Plea%20- %20Schultz.pdf [http://perma.cc/V3TC-
9DC4]; Sara Ganim, Penn State Officials Conspired To Protect Themselves and Jerry Sandusky, AG
Says, PATRIOT-NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/11/
ag-sandusky-coverup was not a.html [http://perma.cc/5YRG-TM2U] [hereinafter Ganim, Penn State
Officials]. As discussed in more detail below, they and then-Penn State University President Graham
Spanier were later charged with conspiracy and obstruction of justice, in addition to the initial perjury
and failure to report charges. See infra note 71 75 and accompanying text.
61. Ex-Penn State Officials Accused of 'Conspiracy of Silence,' CNN (Nov. 1, 2012, 6:01 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/01/justice/penn-state-scandal/ [http://perma.cc/95U5-4VBE].
62. Spanier's initial November 5, 2011, press release stated:
The allegations about a former coach are troubling, and it is appropriate that they be
investigated thoroughly. Protecting children requires the utmost vigilance.
With regard to the other presentments, I wish to say that Tim Curley and Gary Schultz
have my unconditional support. I have known and worked daily with Tim and Gary for
more than 16 years. I have complete confidence in how they have handled the allegations
about a former University employee.
Tim Curley and Gary Schultz operate at the highest levels of honesty, integrity and
compassion. I am confident the record will show that these charges are groundless and
that they conducted themselves professionally and appropriately.
Statement from President Spanier, PENN STATE NEWS (Nov. 5, 2011), http://news.psu.edu/story/153819/
2011/11/05/statement-president-spanier [http://perma.cc/8UAJ-SLFM].
63. As discussed in more detail below, Spanier's support of Curley and Schultz was later one of
the grounds for criminal conspiracy and obstruction of justice charges against Spanier, Schultz, and
Curley. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of these charges.
64. Spanier's statement in support of Schultz and Curley had significant negative financial
repercussions for the university. See Mark Tracy, Mike McQueary Is Awarded $7.3 Million in Penn
State Defamation Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2dN46eF [http://perma.cc/F3R4-
7DTM]. In October 2016 a jury awarded former Penn State assistant football coach Mike McQueary,
who had testified to the investigating grand jury that he had seen Sandusky abusing a child in a Penn
State athletic facility shower room, $7.3 million in damages in a defamation case based largely on
Spanier's public statement of support for Schultz and Curley. See id.; see also Verdict Slip, McQueary
v. Pa. State Univ., No. 2012-1804 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 30, 2016), http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/
media/upload/mcquearyo20verdicto20slip.pdf [http://perma.cc/A7UK-GKG3] (awarding $1,150,000
in compensatory damages for defamation, $1,150,000 in compensatory damages for misrepresentation,
and $5,000,000 in punitive damages for misrepresentation). McQueary alleged that he was terminated
after he told investigators from the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office that in 2001 he had
reported an incident of child abuse by Sandusky to then-head football coach Joe Paterno, who then
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The day after the charges against Sandusky, Schultz, and Curley were
announced, the Penn State University Board of Trustees met with Spanier.
65
After that meeting Spanier issued a second press release stating that Curley and
Schultz were being placed on administrative leave while they defended
themselves against the perjury and failure to report child abuse charges. 66 An
investigative report that was later prepared for the Board of Trustees by former
Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh (the Freeh Report) stated
that "several Trustees described the second press release as a 'turning point' for
Spanier" because the Board itself had decided that Curley and Schultz should be
suspended, and the Board was displeased with the wording of Spanier's press
release.67 On November 9, 2011, the Penn State Board of Trustees met and
decided to terminate Spanier without cause.
68
reported the matter to Curley and Schultz. See Complaint 12, McQueary v. Pa. State Univ., No.
2012-1804 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 30, 2016), http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/mcqueary
%20vs% 20the%20pennsylvania%20state %20university% 20complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/atp6-jswb].
In the same case the trial judge subsequently awarded McQueary an additional $4,900,000 for his state
law whistleblower claim against Penn State. See Order, McQueary v. Pa. State Univ., No. 2012-1804
(Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 30, 2016), http://co.centre.pa.us/centreco/media/upload/mcqueary /20order
%20filed%20november%2030%202016.pdf [http://perma.cc/G7ME-53RB] (awarding $3,974,048 for
past/future economic loss and $1,000,000 for past/future non-economic loss).
65. See Sara Ganim & Jan Murphy, Inside Penn State Board of Trustees, Battle Brews Over Sex
Scandal, PATRIOT-NEWS (Nov. 9, 2011, 7:17 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/
11/jerry-sandusky-penn-state-trus.html [http://perma.cc/DGM6-ACR4]. The only official record of a
November 2011 meeting is the minutes of the November 11, 2011, meeting. See PAULA R.
AMMERMAN, PA. STATE UNIV. BD. OF TRUSTEES, MINUTES OF MEETING 6 (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://trustees.psu.edu/pdf/november20llminutesbot.pdf [http://perma.cciY854-SZU8]. The Board of
Trustees did not allow public access to the minutes of other meetings in November 2011. See Lauren
Davis, Opinion, Transparency to Public Vital for Board of Trustees, DAILY COLLEGIAN (Oct. 31,
2016), http://www.collegian.psu.edu/opinion/editorials/article-117d2262-9efc-1le6-9c62-47129c2178d2.
html [http://perma.cc/7LJW-4LCC].
66. See Trustees Announce 2 Officials To Step Down While Case Is Investigated, PENN STATE
NEWS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://news.psu.edu/story/153816/2011/11/07/trustees-announce-2-officials-step-
down-while-case-investigated [http://perma.cc/XXF5-5HER].
67. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL
REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY 93 (2012) [hereinafter FREEH REPORT],
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/396512-report-final-071212.html [http://perma.cc/VAF4-
K6F5]; see also Former FBI Director Freeh To Conduct Independent Investigation, PENN STATE NEWS
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://news.psu.edu/story/153530/2011/11/21/former-fbi-director-freeh-conduct-
independent-investigation [http://perma.cc/64KU-VZRY].
68. See AMMERMAN, supra note 65, at 6; Report of the Board of Trustees Concerning Nov. 9
Decisions, PENN STATE NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://news.psu.edu/story/150954/2012/03/12/report-
board-trustees-concerning-nov-9-decisions [http://perma.cc/U4K3-3SK7]; see also Sara Ganim & Jeff
Frantz, President Graham Spanier Ousted by Penn State Trustees, PATRIOT-NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/11/president-grahamspanier also.html [http://
perma.cc/D86R-JHES]. At the November 9 meeting, the Board of Trustees also decided to terminate
Penn State's long-serving head football coach Joe Paterno. Report of the Board of Trustees Concerning
Nov. 9 Decisions, supra; see also David Jones, Penn State's Firing of Graham Spanier, Joe Paterno the
First Step Toward Cleansing, PENN LIVE (Nov. 11, 2011), http://blog.pennlive.com/davidjones/2011/11/
pennstate board of trustees d.html [http://perma.cc/RJ82-8G9V]. The Board's decision to terminate
Paterno has proved to be one of the most controversial actions in the entire Sandusky debacle, in part
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Spanier's termination by the Board of Trustees was only the beginning of
the travails he would face as a result of his actions in connection with the
Sandusky scandal. In their investigation for the preparation of the Freeh Report,
investigators found emails and documentary evidence 69 about Spanier, Schultz,
and Curley that had not previously been produced to the investigating grand jury
in response to grand jury subpoenas to the university.70 In his final report Freeh
concluded that this evidence showed "total and consistent disregard by the most
senior leaders at Penn State for the safety and welfare of Sandusky's child
victims."71  Freeh's investigators "immediately provided [the emails and
documentary evidence] to law enforcement when they were discovered,"72 and
on November 1, 2012, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office charged
Spanier with eight counts of endangering the welfare of children, failure to
report child abuse, perjury, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to obstruct
justice, commit perjury, and endanger the welfare of children.73 The Attorney
General's Office also filed additional charges against Curley and Schultz for
endangering the welfare of children, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to
obstruct justice, commit perjury, and endanger the welfare of children.7 4
Then-acting Attorney General Linda Kelly held a press conference to announce
the charges against Spanier, Schultz, and Curley, and stated: "This was not a
mistake by these men. It was not an oversight. It was not misjudgment on their
part. This was a conspiracy of silence by top officials working to actively conceal
the truth, with total disregard for the children who were Sandusky's victims in
this case." '7
5
because of the manner in which Paterno was terminated by a telephone call with no advance notice.
See Dave Sheinin, Joe Paterno Fired as Football Coach at Penn State, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/Joe-paterno-will-retire-at-end-of-penn-state-football-
season/2011/11/09/gIQAQbkb6M story.html [http://perma.cc/4JKH-A23R]. Paterno's termination
remains a subject of controversy and contention among Penn State supporters and detractors. See, e.g.,
Wallace McKelvey, Five Years After Joe Paterno's Firing, Penn State Trustee Continues To Rail
Against Decision, PENN LIVE (Nov. 5, 2016, 8:21 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/11/five-
years-afterjoe-paternos.html [http://perma.cc/V6JU-DCRA].
69. See FREEH REPORT, supra note 67, at 68 78.
70. See id. at 16, 50-76.
71. See id. at 14.
72. Id. at 11.
73. Criminal Docket at 2, Commonwealth v. Spanier, No. MJ-12303-CR-0000419-2012 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.scribd.com/document/111792451/Graham-Spanier-charged-in-
Jerry-Sandusky-case [http://perma.cc/W8AA-XREX]; see also Steve Eder, Former Penn State
President Is Charged in Sandusky Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), http://nyti.ms/2EIGmiv
[http://perma.cc/R8UQ-T3NN]; Ganim, Penn State Officials, supra note 60; University Officials Issue
Statement on Attorney General's Actions, PENN STATE NEWS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://news.psu.edu/
story/145000/2012/11/01/university-officials-issue-statement-attorney-generals-actions [http://perma.cc/
4MV3-AT49].
74. See Criminal Docket, Commonwealth v. Schultz, No. MJ-12303-CR-0000420-2012 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.scribd.com/document/111795193/Schultz-Charges [http://perma.cc/
JY9S-4QN9]; Criminal Docket, Commonwealth v. Curley, No. MJ-12303-CR-0000421-2012 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.scribd.com/document/111794212/Curley-Charges [http://perma.cc/
S7WD-XQCN].
75. Ex-Penn State Officials Accused of 'Conspiracy of Silence,' supra note 61 (quoting Kelly).
[Vol. 91
2019] THE PENN STATE THREE CASE AND THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION 571
Spanier, Schultz, and Curley vigorously contested the criminal charges
against them for almost five years, but in March 2017 Curley and Schultz each
pled guilty to a single misdemeanor charge of endangering the welfare of
children and agreed to cooperate with the Attorney General's Office in Spanier's
criminal trial.71 Spanier continued to contest the criminal charges against him by
proceeding to trial, but on March 24, 2017, a jury found Spanier guilty of one
misdemeanor charge of endangering the welfare of children.
77
2. An Attorney-Client Privilege Issue Consumes the Case
An in-depth analysis of the evidence and the criminal charges against
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier is beyond the scope of this Article, and the relevant
information is readily available in judicial opinions78 and the Freeh Report. 79
Instead, the focus of this Article is the attorney-client privilege issue that arose
when Penn State's in-house general counsel Cynthia Baldwin accompanied
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier to their state grand jury appearances. 80
After Freeh's investigation revealed emails and documents that had not
been produced to the Sandusky grand jury, but prior to the filing of criminal
charges against Spanier and additional criminal charges against Curley and
Schultz, Penn State University waived its attorney-client privilege with respect to
Baldwin's representation of the university in the Sandusky matter and, in
particular, the university's compliance with investigative efforts in the Sandusky
76. See Guilty Plea Agreement at 1 2, Commonwealth v. Curley, No. CP-22-CR-0003614-2013
(Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.dauphincounty.org/Courts/CurleySchultzSpanier/3-13-
17 %2OAmended%20Criminal%20Information%20and%2OGuilty% 20Plea%20- %20Curley.pdf [http
://perma.cc/7UAQ-KK8S]; Guilty Plea Agreement at 1 2, Commonwealth v. Schultz, No. CP-22-CR-
0003616-2013 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.dauphincounty.org/Courts/
CurleySchultzSpanier/3-13-17%2OAmended%2Crimina%2Information%20 and%2Guity%2Pe
a%20-%2OSchultz.pdf [http://perma.cc/V3TC-9DC4]; see also Charles Thompson, Tim Curley, Gary
Schultz Plead Guilty in Sandusky Coverup Case, PENN LIVE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.pennlive.com/
news/2017/03/tim curley-files-plea in sandu.html [http://perma.cc/22SC-CA44].
77. See Will Hobson, Former Penn State President Graham Spanier Convicted of Child
Endangerment, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/former-
penn-state-president-graham-spanier-convicted-of-child-endangerment/2017/03/24/d1936e34-109a-
11e7-9bOd-d27c98455440_story.html [http://perma.cc/U9LA-EU5T]. Spanier was acquitted of a felony
charge of endangering the welfare of children and a felony charge of conspiring to endanger the
welfare of children. See id. On June 26, 2018, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Spanier's
conviction for one count of endangering the welfare of children. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192
A.3d 141, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
78. See Commonwealth v. Curley, 131 A.3d 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v.
Schultz, 133 A.3d 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Spanier, 132 A.3d 481 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2016); Order, Commonwealth v. Curley, Nos. 3614 CR 2013, 5165 CR 2011, 3616 CR 2013, 5164 CR
2011, 3615 CR 2013, 2015 WL 13216773 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.scribd.com/
document/252653399/Order-on-Curley-Schultz-and-Spanier [http://perma.cc/S789-VKY2].
79. See generally FREEH REPORT, supra note 67.
80. In Pennsylvania, unlike in the federal criminal justice system, an attorney is permitted to
accompany a witness during the witness's grand jury testimony. Compare 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 4549(c) (West 2019) (granting the right to counsel at a grand jury appearance), with FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(1) (stating that only attorneys for the government, a witness being questioned, an
interpreter, and the court reporter or operator of the recording devise are permitted to be present).
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grand jury investigation.8 ' This waiver of attorney-client privilege by the
university allowed Baldwin, who had served as the university's in-house counsel
during the grand jury investigation of Sandusky, to provide grand jury testimony
in October 2012 about Penn State's previous efforts to comply with grand jury
subpoenas for documents and records relating to Sandusky. 2 The university and
Baldwin agreed with the Attorney General's Office, however, that Baldwin
would not testify about "any of the issues relating to the testimony of Mr. Schultz
and Mr. Curley and conversations she had with them about that testimony."
8 3
The reason for this limitation on the scope of Baldwin's grand jury testimony was
that Schultz and Curley had asserted, through their counsel, that they each had a
personal attorney-client relationship with Baldwin because she had accompanied
them to their grand jury testimony.8 4
The Attorney General's Office disputed the personal attorney-client
privilege claim by Schultz and Curley, 5 but in an effort to ameliorate the
personal attorney-client privilege dispute, the lead prosecutor for the Attorney
General's Office represented to the supervising judge for the grand jury
investigation that he would not question Baldwin about her communications
with Curley and Schultz relating to their grand jury appearances.8 6 The
supervising judge agreed that Baldwin could testify before the grand jury under
that limitation.
8 7
Despite that limitation, during Baldwin's grand jury testimony she was
asked a number of questions about her interactions with Spanier, Schultz, and
Curley prior to their grand jury testimony, and in particular, she testified that
when she accompanied Spanier, Schultz, and Curley to their grand jury
appearances, she had no knowledge of the email communications and documents
that had not been produced to the grand jury.8 8 In response to questions from
the prosecutor, Baldwin testified that Spanier, Schultz, and Curley had not told
her the truth about their knowledge of the Sandusky matter and that she had
concluded Spanier was "not a person of integrity" and she had "no doubt that he
81. See Transcript of Proceedings of Grand Jury at 3 4, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Thirty-
Third Statewide Investigation Grand Jury, In re Notice No. 1 (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.scribd.com/
document/192201108/Cynthia-Baldwin-grand-jury-proceedings-October-22-2012 [http://perma.cc/u2sj-
nf8n].
82. See id. at 1 4.
83. See id. at 4 6.
84. See id. at 4 (recounting the statement to the court by counsel for the Pennsylvania Attorney
General's Office describing the claims of attorney-client privilege by Schultz and Curley).
85. See id. at 11 ("The Commonwealth ... is going to take a very clear position as does Miss
Baldwin that she was University Counsel and she was not individually representing those two
gentlemen" (statement of Michael M. Mustokoff, counsel for the Pennsylvania Attorney General's
Office)).
86. See id. at 10.
87. Seeid. at 11-14.
88. See Transcript of Proceedings of Grand Jury at 69, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Thirty-
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lied to [her]."8 9 This testimony ultimately had very significant consequences in
the criminal prosecutions of Spanier, Schultz, and Curley.
90
As noted above, in November 2012, after Baldwin's grand jury testimony,
the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office filed criminal charges against
Spanier and additional charges of conspiracy and obstruction of justice against
Curley and Schultz, charging the three men with a "conspiracy of silence" to
cover up Sandusky's crimes. 91 Spanier, Schultz, and Curley all later moved to
have the charges against them quashed because they contended that Baldwin's
grand jury testimony had violated their personal attorney-client privilege with
Baldwin. 92 The trial court issued a lengthy opinion rejecting the three
defendants' personal attorney-client privilege claims and concluding that
Baldwin had represented them only as agents of the university 93 and had acted
appropriately in doing so based on the information known to her at the time.
94
The three defendants then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
95
The Superior Court took a different analytical approach to the personal
attorney-client privilege claims, rejecting the trial court's agency analysis and
focusing on Pennsylvania's statutory right to counsel during grand jury
testimony. 96 The Superior Court concluded that Baldwin had failed to
adequately advise Schultz that she was representing him only in his capacity as
an officer of Penn State University and not in his personal capacity. 97 Based on
89. Id. at 70.
90. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the trial court's analysis of
Baldwin's attorney-client privilege claim.
91. See Sara Ganim, Graham Spanier, Other Penn State Officials Showed 'Total Disregard to the
Suffering of Children,' AG Says, PATRIOT-NEWS (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/
2012/11/grahamspanier otherpennstat.html [http://perma.cc/P4D8-GPBR] (quoting Pennsylvania
Attorney General Linda Kelly). See supra notes 69 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
criminal charges against Spanier, Curley, and Schultz.
92. Order, Commonwealth v. Curley, Nos. 3614 CR 2013, 5165 CR 2011, 3616 CR 2013, 5164
CR 2011, 3615 CR 2013, 2015 WL 13216773, at *2 3 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 14, 2015).
93. See id. at *14.
94. See id. at *15.
95. See Commonwealth v. Curley, 131 A.3d 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v.
Schultz, 133 A.3d 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Spanier, 132 A.3d 481 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2016).
96. See Schultz, 133 A.3d at 320 24 ("Pointedly, the presence of the attorney in the grand jury
room would be rendered nugatory if that lawyer is not present for the purpose of protecting the
witness against incriminating himself.").
97. See id. at 323 ("Ms. Baldwin did not explain to Schultz that her representation of him was
solely as an agent of Penn State and that she did not represent his individual interests."). As this
Article was being prepared for publication, the Hearing Committee of the Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued a report concluding that, based upon the information then
reasonably available to Baldwin and her reasonable investigation, she had reasonably concluded that
the interests of Penn State University and the senior officials were consistent, she properly informed
the individual officials of those circumstances, and they effectively consented to being jointly
represented with the University. Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Committee at 41, Office
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baldwin, No. 151 DB 2017, (Pa. Disciplinary Bd. Oct. 26, 2018). The
Hearing Committee further concluded that Baldwin had not violated any ethical rules in her grand
jury testimony. Id. at 42.
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that conclusion, the Superior Court went on to hold that all communications
between Schultz and Baldwin were protected by the attorney-client privilege and
Baldwin had "breached that privilege by testifying before the grand jury with
respect to such communications." 98 The court went on to quash the perjury,
obstruction of justice, and conspiracy charges against Schultz. 99 Following its
analysis in that case, the Superior Court also quashed the perjury, obstruction of
justice, and conspiracy charges against Curley °° and Spanier.1 1
While the individual and entity attorney-client privilege issues that divided
the trial court and the Superior Court are important legal issues that are worthy
of careful study and analysis, they are not central to the primary focus of this
Article, which is the crime-fraud exception to the privilege. In a somewhat
enigmatic footnote in Commonwealth v. Schultz,"°2 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court noted that the prosecution "did not raise any argument that Ms. Baldwin
could testify regarding any privileged communications as a result of the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege."'1 3 This footnote might be
read as questioning why the prosecution did not seek to invoke the crime-fraud
exception. Alternatively, and in light of the case citation in the footnote, 10 4 it
might be read as suggesting that under Pennsylvania law the requirements for
application of the crime-fraud exception would not have been met. The next
Section of this Article focuses on that issue.
III. VARYING TESTS FOR WHEN THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION SHOULD
VITIATE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
As noted above, 10 5 the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the
issues presented by application of the crime-fraud exception in 1989 with its
decision in United States v. Zolin.106 Zolin did not answer every question
concerning application of the exception, and it failed to provide guidance on the
critical issue that is the focus of this Article.0 7 The focus of the Court's opinion
in Zolin was not "the quantum of proof necessary ultimately to establish the
applicability of the crime-fraud exception" but rather the showing required to
obtain in camera judicial review of the privileged communications at issue so
98. Schultz, 133 A.3d at 325.
99. Id. at 327 28.
100. See Curley, 131 A.3d at 1007.
101. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 132 A.3d 481, 498 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
102. 133 A.3d 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
103. Schultz, 133 A.3d at 306 n.13.
104. After stating that no crime-fraud exception argument had been advanced, the Superior
Court cited In re Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia County, 593 A.2d 402 (Pa. 1991), for the
proposition that the "crime-fraud exception excludes ... communications between an attorney and
client that are made for the purpose of committing a crime or fraud." Schultz, 133 A.3d at 306 n.13.
105. See supra notes 7 8 and accompanying text.
106. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
107. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 8(-81 ("Zolin does not identify any new substantive dividing
line for assessing when communications fit the crime-fraud definitions. Zolin is procedural in
nature.").
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that a court can make the determination of whether or not the exception
applies. 1
0 8
The Court first made clear that [a] blanket rule allowing in camera review
as a tool for determining the applicability of the crime-fraud exception ... would
place the policy of protecting open and legitimate disclosure between attorneys
and clients at undue risk" and that the party seeking review could not "engage in
groundless fishing expeditions."'' 0 9 The Court then set forth a test to determine
whether in camera review should be granted by a court considering a
crime-fraud exception claim: ' [T]he judge should require a showing of a factual
basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person,' that in
camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that
the crime-fraud exception applies." 110 The Court left the final determination of
whether that test was satisfied to the discretion of the district court to decide on
remand."'
The Zolin Court also rejected the "independent evidence requirement" that
had been applied by the appellate court below, concluding that "evidence
directly but incompletely reflecting the content of the contested
communications" could be used by a court to determine whether in camera
review of the privileged communications themselves would be appropriate.
112
The Court held that "the party opposing the privilege may use any nonprivileged
evidence in support of its request for in camera review, even if its evidence is not
'independent' of the contested communications."
1 1 3
Zolin's adoption of the reasonable belief standard and rejection of the
independent evidence requirement removes significant procedural obstacles for
parties seeking to establish that the crime-fraud exception applies, while
retaining the important safeguard of judicial review (in camera to protect the
confidentiality of the privileged communications if the challenge fails) in
determining whether the exception should be applied. Unfortunately, the Zolin
opinion does not provide further guidance as to what constitutes sufficient proof
to establish applicability of the crime-fraud exception and does not suggest how
that quantum of proof exceeds the showing necessary to obtain an in camera
108. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563-65.
109. Id. at 571.
110. Id. at 572 (citation omitted) (quoting Caldwell v. Dist. Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 573 74. The Court concluded that "the party opposing the privilege may use any
nonprivileged evidence in support of its request for in camera review, even if its evidence is not
'independent' of the contested communications." Id. at 574. In a footnote to the quoted statement, the
Court also concluded that such evidence "may be used not only in the pursuit of in camera review, but
also may provide the evidentiary basis for the ultimate showing that the crime-fraud exception
applies." Id. at 574 n.12.
113. Id. at 574. For more detailed analysis of the Zolin case, see Galanek, supra note 13, at 1115;
Hutzel, supra note 11, at 365; S. Aftab Sharif, Note, Another Independent Evidence Rule Goes Up in
Smoke: The Supreme Court Strikes a Balance in United States v. Zolin, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 127,
127 (1990).
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inspection." 4 The law in this difficult area is unsettled and still evolving," 5 and
this Section examines the approaches that various courts have taken to
determine when to rely upon the crime-fraud exception to vitiate the
confidentiality protections of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney
work-product doctrine.
A. The Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits: A Relatively Lenient Test
The crime-fraud exception varies among circuits because courts disagree on
the relationship or relatedness required between the documents and
communications sought through application of the exception and the prima facie
violation. 116 The least stringent test has been developed in the Fifth, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits. The Fifth Circuit outlined its crime-fraud exception test in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena.117 In a case involving a witness and his attorney who
allegedly worked together to falsify a sworn affidavit," 8 the court in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena articulated the test for the application of the crime-fraud
exception as follows: "[T]he only attorney-client communications and work
product materials falling within the scope of the crime-fraud exception are those
shown to hold 'some valid relationship' to the prima facie violation such that
they 'reasonably relate to the fraudulent activity."' 9 The D.C. Circuit uses
similar "relates to" language in its crime-fraud exception test-the work product
114. The Supreme Court noted that use "of the phrase 'prima facie case' to describe the showing
needed to defeat the privilege has caused some confusion," Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563 n.7, and quoted
criticism of courts that "have allowed themselves to be led into holding that only a superficial,
one-sided showing is allowable on any admissibility controversy," id. at 564 n.7 (quoting John
MacArthur Maguire & Charles S. S. Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining
Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392, 400 (1927)). The Court also acknowledged that
"[t]he quantum of proof needed to establish admissibility was then, and remains, subject to question."
Id. The greater "quantum of proof" needed to establish applicability of the crime-fraud exception may
be demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit's opinion after Zolin was remanded by the Supreme Court. See
United States v. Zolin, 905 F.2d 1344, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit found that the parties to
the taped conversations at issue "admit on the tapes that they are attempting to confuse and defraud
the U.S. Government." Id. The Ninth Circuit thus held that the crime-fraud exception is applicable
when an in camera review revealed explicit admissions of an intent to defraud. But cf. Henning, supra
note 13, at 462 ("While Zolin thus rejects the proposition that it is addressing the issue of what
quantum of proof is necessary to vitiate a claim of privilege, the Court's analysis of how much
evidence must be introduced to have a district court conduct an in camera review effectively resolves
the issue of what proof is sufficient to establish the application of the crime-fraud exception.").
115. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 80t-81 ("Zolin does not identify any new substantive dividing
line for assessing when communications fit the crime-fraud definitions. Zolin is procedural in
nature."). For post-Zolin applications of the crime-fraud exception by the lower federal courts, see
Roe It, 168 F.3d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A] party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception must at
least demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or
committed and that the communications were in furtherance thereof." (quoting In re Richard Roe,
Inc. (Roe I), 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995))).
116. See Sealed Case I, 676 F.2d 793, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
117. 419 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2005).
118. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d at 331 34.
119. Id. at 346 (quoting In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir.
2002)).
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or communication must "reasonably relate[] to the subject matter of the possible
violation"120 -which is similar in effect to the Fifth Circuit test. The Ninth
Circuit follows a similar approach.
12 1
These three circuits thus apply a test that requires only some kind of
reasonable relationship or nexus, which in most instances will be a relatively
easily satisfied test where there is credible evidence of an ongoing crime or
conspiracy to cover up prior criminal misconduct. This is the test that was
applied in the Manafort Opinion. 22 This more lenient test allows for a more
readily available application of the crime-fraud exception in cases in which the
privilege is being abused in connection with an ongoing or future crime or fraud.
B. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits: A Stringent Test
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits significantly tighten the test for the
application of the crime-fraud exception by applying a test that is satisfied only
with a close nexus between the privileged communications or documents and the
prima facie violation. The Fourth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings # 5
Empanelled January 28, 2004123 articulated the test as follows: "[T]he documents
containing the privileged materials [must] bear a close relationship to the client's
existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud."'124 The Tenth Circuit
applies a similar test: "The evidence must show that the client was engaged in or
was planning the criminal or fraudulent conduct when it sought the assistance of
counsel and that the assistance was obtained in furtherance of the conduct or was
closely related to it.",1 2
5
These circuits thus require a significantly more stringent test than the Fifth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, in that not just "some relationship" or connection is
required but rather a "close" relationship between the privileged
communications and the criminal activity.
120. Sealed Case , 676 F.2d at 815.
121. See United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the government
must show "that the communications with the lawyer were 'in furtherance of an intended or present
illegality and that there is some relationship between the communications and the illegality' [in order to
make] a prima facie case" (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1997))); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir.
1996) ("To invoke the crime-fraud exception successfully, the government has the burden of making a
prima facie showing that the communications were in furtherance of an intended or present illegality
and that there is some relationship between the communications and the illegality." (emphasis added)
(quoting In re The Corporation, 87 F.3d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1996))).
122. See supra notes 26 38 and accompanying text.
123. 401 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2005).
124. In re Grand Jury Proceedings # 5, 401 F.3d at 251; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 642
F. App'x 223, 226 (4th Cir. 2016); In re Grand Jury Subpoena # 06-1, 274 F. App'x 306, 309 (4th Cir.
2008); Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 403 (4th Cir. 1999); United Bank v. Buckingham, 301 F.
Supp. 3d 547, 552 53 (D. Md. 2018).
125. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 660 (10th Cir. 1998).
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C. The Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits: A More Stringent Test
The Third Circuit, following precedent from the Second and Eighth
Circuits, applies the most stringent test of all the federal circuits. The Third
Circuit requires that the communication lead the client in the commission of the
criminal act.'26 Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.127 sets out this test.128 In Haines the
administrator of the estate of a deceased smoker filed a personal injury suit
against Liggett Group, Inc., Loew's Theatres, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Philip Morris Incorporated, and the Tobacco Institute. 129 The plaintiff alleged
product liability, tort, and conspiracy claims and eventually sought discovery of
documents related to the Council for Tobacco Research. 30 In response to the
plaintiff's discovery request, Liggett Group withheld 1,500 documents that it
claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
doctrine.' 3 ' The plaintiff argued that the crime-fraud exception applied. 3 2 The
Haines court explained the application of the crime-fraud exception and
articulated the following test:
We must always keep in mind that the purpose of the crime-fraud
exception is to assure that the "seal of secrecy" between lawyer and
client does not extend to communications from the lawyer to the client
made by the lawyer for the purpose of giving advice for the
commission of a fraud or crime. The seal is broken when the lawyer's
communication is meant to facilitate future wrongdoing by the client.
Where the client commits a fraud or crime for reasons completely
independent of legitimate advice communicated by the lawyer, the seal
is not broken, for the advice is, as the logicians explain, non causa pro
causa. The communication condemned and unprotected by the
attorney-client privilege is advice that is illicit because it gives direction
for the commission of future fraud or crime. The advice must relate to
future illicit conduct by the client; it is the causa pro causa, the advice
that leads to the deed. 133
This case demonstrates that in the Third Circuit successful invocation of the
crime-fraud exception is difficult. The Third Circuit's test is satisfied only if the
advice "is meant to facilitate" or "gives direction for the commission" of criminal
or fraudulent actions by the clients-a much higher standard than "a close
126. See Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
127. 975 F.2d 81 (3rd Cir. 1992).
128. See Haines, 975 F.2d at 90.
129. Id. at 84-85.
130. Id. at 85.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 86.
133. Id. at 90 (emphases added).
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relationship" standard.'34 The Second and Eighth Circuits follow a similarly
stringent test.
35
In addition to being arguably out of step with the more lenient tests in other
circuits that are discussed above, 36 this "facilitate or direct" test appears to
suggest that some measure of knowledge of wrongdoing or intent to facilitate
wrongdoing by the attorney is required for the exception to apply. Such a
requirement not only is contrary to the well-settled rule that it is the intent and
actions of the client, not the attorney, that govern whether the exception should
apply 137 but also is inconsistent with the policy grounds upon which the
exception is based. 138 If the crime-fraud exception can be applied only when the
attorney participates in or even knows of the client's crime or fraud, then it could
not be applied in cases, such as the Manafort and Lewinsky cases described
above, 139 when an attorney's services are being used to provide false information
in a court case or to the government-an untenable result. For that reason alone,
the language from the Third Circuit that is highlighted above should not be read
literally, and courts in the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits should take care
not to permit a too-restrictive test for application of the crime-fraud exception to
allow clients to give false testimony or submit false and misleading information
to the government.
D. Pennsylvania: An Especially Stringent Test
As recognized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Penn State Three
cases that are discussed above, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has adopted
an especially stringent test for application of the crime-fraud exception in
Pennsylvania state court cases. 4 ' In In re Investigating Grand Jury of
Philadelphia County,141 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he
privilege does not protect communications made for the purpose or in the course
of the commission of proposed crime or fraud."' 42 On its face, this definition
would appear to be quite broad, particularly the recognition in the emphasized
clause that communications "in the course of" an ongoing crime or fraud
(presumably including a conspiracy to cover up past crimes and ongoing
134. Compare id. at 90 ("The communication condemned and unprotected ... is advice that is
illicit because it gives direction for the commission of future fraud or crime."), with In re Grand Jury
Proceedings #5, 401 F.3d 247, 251 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he privileged material [must] bear a close
relationship to the client's exiting or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.").
135. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
communication must be "made in furtherance of the client's alleged crime or fraud"); Roe I, 68 F.3d
38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the communication must be in "furtherance" of the crime).
136. See supra Parts III.A B.
137. See supra notes 14 16 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 11 13 and accompanying text.
139. See supra Parts II.A B.
140. See supra Part II.C.
141. 593 A.2d 402 (Pa. 1991).
142. In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila. Cnty., 593 A.2d at 406 (emphasis added).
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obstruction of justice, as was alleged by the Attorney General's Office in the
Penn State Three case) would be subject to the exception. 143
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on, however, to set a high
evidentiary bar for application of the exception, especially in a case involving an
alleged ongoing "cover-up" of past criminal misconduct:
The Commonwealth's claim of abuse requires us in the first instance
to reject outright the bank president's grand jury testimony ... and to
accept its own characterization of the testimony as an "implausible
cover-up". Simply stated, [if] the Commonwealth believes it is so, then
it must be so. But, two conclusions conceivably may be drawn from that
same evidence-that suggested by the Commonwealth, and that argued
by the Petitioners. That is insufficient to satisfy the requisite burden of
proof placed upon the Commonwealth to produce prima facie evidence
that the communications were made in the course of the commission of a
proposed crime or fraud. 144
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's refusal to apply the crime-fraud
exception when two different conclusions "conceivably may be drawn" from the
evidence before the court places an exceptionally high burden on the party
seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception. When that approach is applied to a
case involving allegations of a "cover-up" of illegal conduct, where by definition
much of the evidence may be hidden or even destroyed by the parties engaged in
the cover-up, it makes it very difficult for the prosecution to have confidence
that it will be able to satisfy its burden of proof-production of prima facie
evidence that the communications were made in the course of an ongoing crime
or fraud. 145 In this regard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach to the
crime-fraud exception is arguably even more stringent than the most stringent of
the differing federal court approaches summarized above. 146 As discussed below,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's very strict evidentiary test for application of
the crime-fraud exception could explain why the Pennsylvania Attorney
General's Office did not pursue a crime-fraud exception argument in the Penn
State Three case.
CONCLUSION: DOES THE PENN STATE THREE CASE DEMONSTRATE THAT
COURTS NEED To ADOPT A NEW TEST FOR APPLICATION OF THE CRIME-FRAUD
EXCEPTION TO "COVER-UP" CASES?
The allegations of perjury, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice in the cases
that the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office brought against the Penn State
Three, as well as the conclusions reached by former FBI Director Louis Freeh in
143. See infra Conclusion for an analysis of how the potential application of the crime-fraud
exception to an alleged ongoing conspiracy to cover up past criminal conduct is the key issue in
evaluating the application of the exception to the Penn State Three case.
144. In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila. Cnty., 593 A.2d at 407 (emphasis added).
145. See Galanek, supra note 13, at 1125 (discussing "The Evidentiary Threshold" for
application of the crime-fraud exception).
146. See supra Parts III.A C for a discussion of the different approaches of the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.
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his report, at a minimum raise the question of whether, if those allegations and
conclusions had merit, the crime-fraud exception should have applied to the
cases. For reasons that remain unknown, however, the crime-fraud exception
was not invoked by the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office in its
prosecution of the cases, despite the prosecution's allegations of "a conspiracy of
silence" and an ongoing effort to cover up prior criminal activity by the
defendants.
147
While the public record does not answer this important question, analysis of
the case law that is discussed above suggests that perhaps the reason the
prosecution never sought to utilize the crime-fraud exception may stem from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's especially stringent test for when the crime-fraud
exception applies. It may be that the prosecution concluded that it would not
have been able to meet the requirements of Pennsylvania's 48 stringent test
because "two conclusions conceivably may be drawn from th[e] same
evidence"' 149 regarding the conduct of Spanier, Schultz, and Curley. Based on the
publicly available record, it may have been difficult for the prosecution to
"produce prima facie evidence" that not only proved that the communications
with Baldwin were in the course of an ongoing cover-up but also rebutted the
other conclusion that "conceivably may be drawn from that same evidence"'
5 0
the defendants' ardent protestations that no crimes had occurred and no
cover-up had taken place.
151
The D.C. Circuit's "reasonable relationship" or "nexus" test, in contrast,
would be an easier test for the prosecution to satisfy. 152 Under the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's crime-fraud exception test, however, proving that there was
only one conceivable conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence may
have been seen as too difficult an obstacle for the prosecution to overcome. If
that was the reasoning behind the prosecution's decision not to assert a
crime-fraud exception argument, it might have been a prudent tactical legal
147. In its opinion in Schultz's case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that "[t]he
Commonwealth did not raise any argument that Ms. Baldwin could testify regarding any privileged
communications as a result of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege."
Commonwealth v. Schultz, 133 A.3d 294, 306 n.13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). The court then cited In re
Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia County, 593 A.2d 402 (Pa. 1991), for the proposition that the
"crime-fraud exception excludes from protection those communications between an attorney and
client that are made for the purpose of committing a crime or fraud." Schultz, 133 A.3d at 306 n.13.
Whether this statement and citation were intended to signal that the Pennsylvania Superior Court
questioned whether the crime-fraud exception should have been invoked is a matter of speculation,
but it would seem to suggest that the court at least recognized the possibility that the crime-fraud
exception might be relevant to the case. See id.
148. In addition to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court authority on the crime-fraud exception that
is discussed in Part III.D supra, prosecutors in the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office may have
been concerned about the persuasive impact of the Third Circuit's very stringent test for application of
the exception, also discussed in Part III.C supra.
149. In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila. Cnty., 593 A.2d at 407.
150. See id.
151. See supra notes 76 77 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 26 38, 120 22 and accompanying text.
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judgment by the prosecution, but it does not necessarily reflect either an optimal
application of the crime-fraud exception or good public policy.
With respect to this important public policy issue, it is instructive to note
two findings reached by the Hearing Committee of the Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Baldwin's case."53 First, the Hearing
Committee's report included a finding of fact that "[t]he individual employees
lied to [Baldwin] regarding their prior knowledge of reports regarding certain
conduct by Sandusky and the existence of documents responsive to the
University's [grand jury] subpoena."' 54 Second, in its analysis of the ethical issues
surrounding Baldwin's grand jury testimony, the Hearing Committee concluded
that the employees' statements to Baldwin had been made "for the expressed
purpose of communicating them back to the [Pennsylvania Office of Attorney
General]."' 55 These two conclusions make the Penn State Three case difficult to
distinguish from the efforts to convey false information to government officials
in the Manafort and Lewinsky cases that are discussed above.
156
For this reason, the Manafort and Lewinsky cases are instructive on the
issue of the application of the crime-fraud exception to the Penn State Three
case. Special Counsel Mueller prevailed with his crime-fraud exception argument
in the Manafort case based upon an argument that Manafort and Gates had
sought to use their attorney to convey false information to the federal
government. 157 Manafort and Gates subsequently pled guilty to numerous
federal crimes, including conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration
Act-the subject of the legal work that was the focus of the crime-fraud
exception case.1 58  These subsequent developments support the court's
conclusion that application of the crime-fraud exception was appropriate in the
Manafort case.
The conclusion is even more clear in the Monica Lewinsky case. Subsequent
events demonstrated that Lewinsky had not been truthful in providing
information to her attorney for inclusion in a sworn affidavit that she knew
would be submitted in a judicial proceeding. 159 The judge in that case concluded,
and the D.C. Circuit confirmed, that application of the crime-fraud exception to
Lewinsky's communications with her attorney was appropriate. 60
The Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office charged Spanier, Schultz, and
Curley with lying in their grand jury testimony about their prior actions in the
Sandusky matter and based those charges on testimony of other witnesses, one
of whom was subsequently found credible in an independent legal proceeding, 161
153. Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Committee, supra note 97, at 41.
154. Id. at 40.
155. Id. at 32 33.
156. See supra Parts II.A C.
157. See supra notes 26 38 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 39.
159. See supra notes 40 50 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 46 50 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 64 for an overview of the successful whistleblower case brought by former
Penn State assistant football coach and Sandusky investigation witness Mike McQueary.
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as well as relevant contemporaneous emails and documentary evidence that
initially were not produced in response to grand jury subpoenas. 162 Moreover, as
noted above, the Hearing Committee of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania found that the three Penn State University officials lied to
Baldwin and did so with the intent that false information would be provided to
the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office and its Sandusky grand jury
investigation.
63
In terms of the administration of justice and the application of the
crime-fraud exception, it is difficult to make a meaningful distinction between
the Manafort and Lewinsky cases and the Penn State Three case. The difference
may be that under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court test, unlike the D.C. Circuit
test applied in the Manafort and Lewinsky cases, the evidentiary burden is too
high for the prosecution to be confident that it can succeed in invoking the
crime-fraud exception in Pennsylvania-even in a case involving allegations of a
cover-up of subsequently proven sexual abuse of children.
This analysis suggests that the Pennsylvania courts or the state legislature
should consider developing a clearer and less stringent test for application of the
crime-fraud exception. For example, Pennsylvania could adopt a test that is
modeled on the well-developed D.C. Circuit test that has proved effective in a
wide range of circumstances, including the Manafort and Lewinsky cases
described above. 164 An approach like the Third Circuit test, which requires
showing that the lawyer's advice is intended to facilitate or direct the client's
commission of a crime or fraud, 165 is too high a burden and might allow the
privilege to protect communications, like those in the Manafort and Lewinsky
cases, that are meant to mislead and deceive courts and governmental
authorities.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's requirement that use of the
attorney's advice to facilitate or cover up a crime or fraud must be the only
plausible interpretation of the evidence 166 also sets the bar too high, as perhaps
was illustrated by the prosecution's decision not to invoke the crime-fraud
exception in the Penn State Three case. Instead, the test for application of the
162. See supra notes 69 70 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 154 55 and accompanying text. In this regard, it is particularly important to
note that the Hearing Committee found that:
Here the individual employees had obstructed justice by failing to produce responsive
documents they knew existed with intent to prevent themselves from being incriminated.
They did so by lying to Respondent [Baldwin] with the understanding that she would
knowingly use their denials of additional information in responding to the subpoena for
the University and them, which is precisely what she did: She responded to a lawful
subpoena in her capacity as their lawyer and an officer of the court by unwittingly
transmitting their lies as truth.
Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Committee, supra note 97, at 31 32. This finding
supports the conclusion that the crime-fraud exception should have applied to the Penn State Three
cases in the same manner as it did in the Manafort and Lewinsky cases.
164. See supra Parts II.A B.
165. See supra Part III.C.
166. See supra Part III.D.
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crime-fraud exception should be based upon credible evidence of the client's
intentional misuse of the attorney-client relationship, particularly when the
misuse of the attorney's services is intended to interfere with the administration
of justice or cover up an ongoing course of criminal conduct, such as a conspiracy
to obstruct justice. This approach strikes a proper balance between the
important policy interests underlying the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine, while ensuring that clients cannot lie to or conceal
information from their attorney and by so doing use the legal services of an
unwitting attorney to further their efforts to obstruct justice and cover up past
criminal activity.
